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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - LEGISLATIVE
IMMUNITY OUTWEIGHS FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHTS
In Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund' the United States
Supreme Court held that even in the face of an alleged infringement of first
amendment rights, when a Senate subcommittee's activity falls within the
"legitimate legislative sphere, "I the speech or debate clause of the United
States Constitution3 protects the activities of the subcommittee, the individual senators and the chief counsel, thereby prohibiting judicial interference to enjoin a subpoena issued by the subcommittee.
Respondent, United States Servicemen's Fund, Inc. (USSF), was a nonprofit membership corporation which purported "to further the welfare of
persons who have served or are presently in the military."4 In attempting
to accomplish this goal the respondent, USSF, had established "coffeehouses" near United States military bases and had aided "underground
newspapers" with the purpose of furthering dissent and expressions of
opposition within the military towards United States involvement in
southeast Asia.5 Pursuant to the broad authority granted the Subcommittee on Internal Security by the Senate for enforcing the Internal Security
Act of 1950,1 the subcommittee, chaired by Senator James 0. Eastland,
began an investigation into USSF's activities in the early part of 1970 to
determine if there had been any foreign infiltration into the organization.
During the course of the investigation the subcommittee sought to examine
certain financial records of the respondent corporation and therefore issued
a subpoena duces tecum to the bank where USSF maintained its account,
ordering the bank to produce " 'any and all records appertaining to or
involving the account or accounts of [USSFI . . . .' " Before the return
date of the subpoena, USSF and two of its members filed suit in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia to enjoin its implementa1. 421 U.S. 491, 95 S.Ct. 1813, 44 L.Ed.2d 324 (1975).
2. Id. at 503, 506-07, 95 S.Ct. at 1820, 1823, 44 L.Ed.2d at 335, 338-39.
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, §6, cl.1, reads in part:
in all Cases, except Treason, Felony
The Senators and Representatives shall ..
and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the
session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same;
and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any
other Place. (emphasis added)
4. 421 U.S. at 493, 95 S.Ct. at 1816, 44 L.Ed.2d at 331.
5. Id. at 494, 95 S.Ct. at 1817, 44 L.Ed.2d at 331.
6. S. Res. 341, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REc. 3418 (1970). As part of the broad
authority given the Subcommittee on Internal Security, the Senate authorized a continuing
study and investigation into the extent, nature and effect of subversive activities, including
infiltration of organizations by persons under the domination of foreign governments.
7. 421 U.S. at 494, 95 S.Ct. at 1817, 44 L.Ed.2d at 331.
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tion,5 but the court refused to issue a temporary restraining order., After
hearing testimony, the court also denied USSF's motions for preliminary
and permanent injunctions and dismissed the senators as parties. On appeal,'0 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
reversed and remanded the case to the district court for further consideration, holding that the senators could be parties" and that if necessary,
coercive relief could also be ordered." After granting certiorari, 3 the Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
Legislative immunity, as embodied in the speech or debate clause of the
Constitution, had its origin in England as the result of Parliament's struggle to gain independence from the English Crown. 4 The English Bill of
Rights, enacted in 1689, formally recognized the immunity sought by
members of Parliament to shield them from the King and his courts, and
was quite similar in form and context to that privilege adopted by the
drafters of the United States Constitution. 5 By the time of the American
Revolution, the privilege was so engrained in the democratic idea of gov8.

USSF's complaint charged that
the authorizing resolutions and the Subcommittee's actions implementing them
were an unconstitutional abuse of the legislative power of inquiry, that the "sole
purpose" of the Subcommittee investigation was to force "public disclosure of
beliefs, opinions, expressions and associations of private citizens which may be
unorthodox or unpopular," and that the "sole purpose" of the subponea was to
"harass, chill, punish and deter [USSF and its members] in their exercise of their
rights and duties under the FirstAmendment and particularlyto stifle the freedom
of the press and associationguaranteed by that amendment." The subpoena was
issued to the bank rather than to USSF . . . "in order to deprive [them] of their
rights to protect their private records, such as the sources of their contributions, as
they would be entitled to do if the subponea had been issued against them directly.
... [Flinancial support to USSF is obtained exclusively through contributions from private individuals, and if bank records are disclosed "much of that
financial support will be withdrawn and USSF will be unable to continue its constitutionally protected activities."
421 U.S. at 495-96, 95 S.Ct. at 1817, 44 L.Ed. 2d at 331-32 (emphasis added).
9. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stayed enforcement of the
subpoena awaiting a consideration of the issues by the district court.
10. United States Servicemen's Fund v. Eastland, 488 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
11. The court of appeals held that members of Congress could be added as parties if their
presence is "unavoidable if a valid order is to be entered by the court to vindicate rights which
would otherwise go unredressed." 488 F.2d at 1270.
12. The court of appeals noted that while declaratory relief is preferable, coercive relief
is authorized by implication. 488 F.2d at 1270.
13. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 419 U.S. 823, 95 S.Ct. 288, 42 L.Ed.2d
46 (1974).
14. See generally Reinstein and Silvergate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of
Powers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1973), and Yankwich, The Immunity of Congressional
Speech-Its Origin, Meaning and Scope, 99 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 960 (1950).
15. The English version is as follows: "That the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of
Parliament." Yankwich, supra note 14, at 964.
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ernment that it was quickly incorporated in the federal constitution as well
as into all the state constitutions."6 In 1808 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, in Coffin v. Coffin, 7 became the first American court to
judicially interpret the privilege of legislative immunity and its broad
interpretation has been continously followed in subsequent cases." Justice
Story in writing his 1833 treatise, Commentaries on the Constitutionof the
United States, likewise summarized the importance of the speech or debate clause as "great and vital . . . without which all other privileges
would be comparatively unimportant or ineffectual."' 9 In Kilbourn v.
Thompson ° in 1880 the United States Supreme Court had its first opportunity to interpret the clause. After petitioner Kilbourn had been found
in contempt of Congress for refusing to answer certain questions before a
congressional committee, he brought a civil action against the sergeant-atarms and members of the House of Representatives for his imprisonment
arising out of the contempt charge. In broadly applying the privilege of
legislative immunity, the Court dismissed the members of Congress from
the action. The Court clearly rejected a narrow interpretation that the
privilege only covered those words spoken in debate, and held that the
privilege included "things generally done in a session of the House by one
'
of its members in relation to the business before it."'
After Kilbourn there was a marked absence of cases before the Court
involving the speech or debate clause. It was not until 1951 in Tenney v.
Brandhove 2 that the Court was called upon to delineate the scope of its
authority to consider questions involving the legislative privilege. Even
16. See J.

STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

630 (5th ed.

1891).
17. 4 Mass. 1 (1808).
18. The Massachusetts court interpreted the clause as follows:
These privileges are thus secured, not with the intention of protecting the members against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to support the rights of the
people, by enabling their representatives to execute the functions of their office
without fear of prosecutions, civil or criminal. I therefore think that the article
ought not to be construed strictly, but liberally, that the full design of it may be
answered. I will not confine it to delivering an opinion, uttering a speech, or haranguing in debate; but will extend it to the giving of a vote, to the making of a
written report, and to every other act resulting from the nature, and in the execution, of the office; and I would define the article as securing to every member
exemption from prosecution, for every thing said or done by him, as a representative, in the exercise of the functions of that office, without inquiring whether the
exercise was regular according to the rules of the house, or irregular and against
their rules. I do not confine the member to his place in the house; and I am satisfied
that there are cases in which he is entitled to this privilege, when not within the
walls of the represenatives' chamber.
Yankwich, supra note 14, at 968, quoting from Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1808).
19. Story, supra note 16, at 630.
20. 103 U.S. 168, 26 L.Ed. 377 (1880).
21. Id. at 204, 26 L.Ed. at 391.
22. 341 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 783, 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951).
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though Tenney dealt with a suit involving state legislators, the case is
important because the Court in considering the rationale behind legislative
immunity held that once the legislators were found to be "acting in the
sphere of legitimate legislative activity" a civil action could not be maintained against them. 3 The Court in Tenney interpreted the extent of the
privilege in the following manner:
The claim of an unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their
legislative duty, not for their private indulgence but for the public
good. . . . The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected
to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion
of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a
jury's speculation as to motives ...
The courts should not go beyond the narrow confines of determining
that a committee's inquiry may fairly be deemed within its province. To
find that a committee's investigation has exceeded the bounds of legislative power it must be obvious that there was a usurpation of functions
exclusively vested in the Judiciary or the Executive."
The next case to be heard by the Court involving the clause was United
States v. Johnson,n where the Court held that the clause precluded judicial
inquiry into the motivation for a congressman's speech even though his
speech was the basis for a criminal charge of conspiracy to defraud the
government. Of even more importance however, was the Court's explanation of the immunity privilege as a means "to prevent intimidation by the
executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary." 6
In applying the privilege of immunity later cases have continued to
expand its coverage. In Dombrowski v. Eastland" another case involving
the Internal Security Subcommittee, there was an alleged infringement of
fourth amendment rights. In dismissing the members of Congress from the
suit, the Court held that the members were protected "not only from the
consequences of litigation's results but also from the burden of defending
themselves [in court]."8 Three years later in Powell v. McCormack" the
Court expanded upon a legislator's immunity from the burden of defending
an action against him30 by explaining that "[tlhe purpose of the protection afforded legislators is . . to insure that legislators are not distracted
from or hindered in the performance of their legislative tasks by being
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 376-79, 71 S.Ct. at 788-89, 95 L.Ed. at 1026-28.
Id. at 377-78, 71 S.Ct. at 788-89, 95 L.Ed. at 1027-28.
383 U.S. 169, 86 S.Ct. 749, 15 L.Ed.2d 681 (1966).
Id. at 181, 86 S.Ct. at 755, 15 L.Ed.2d at 688.
387 U.S. 82, 87 S.Ct. 1425, 18 L.Ed.2d 577 (1967).
Id. at 85, 87 S.Ct. at 1427, 18 L.Ed.2d at 580.
395 U.S. 486, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969).
Id. at 503, 89 S.Ct. at 1954, 23 L.Ed.2d at 506.
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called into court to defend their actions."'"
A dichotomy in the application of the privilege in regard to congressional
aides and members of Congress had existed in Kilbourn, Dombrowski and
Powell, where although the actions were dismissed as to the members of
Congress, the aides and employees of the Congressmen were held accountable. In Gravel v. United States" this distinction was discarded on the
theory that a Senator's aide is his alter ego. The Court in Gravel held that
"the Speech or Debate Clause applies not only to a Member but also to
his aides insofar as the conduct of the latter would be a protected legislative act if performed by the Member himself,"3 and therefore extended the
application of immunity to protect congressional aides. The extent of the
application of legislative immunity was dealt with again in Doe v.
McMillan;34 however, the Court declined to extend absolute immunity to
private persons who, with authorization from Congress, distributed reports
which infringed upon the rights of others. In finding the actions "beyond
the reasonable bounds of the legislative task," the suit was allowed to be
maintained against the Government Printing Office but not against the
members of Congress, as their acts were within the legislative function.
In contrast to the judicial expansion of the privilege of legislative immunity, certain critics have asserted that the immunity enjoyed under the
speech or debate clause should be less than absolute.3 6 They contend that
where violations of an individual's constitutional rights are in conflict with
the clause, there should be a balancing of interests and the legislative
privilege should yield to individual constitutional rights. The Court in
Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund (USSF) considered this
contention, but declined to accept it by holding that judicial interference
was not warranted in such a case. In the majority opinion Chief Justice
Burger specifically stated that "the actions of the Senate Subcommittee,
the individual Senators, and the Chief Counsel are protected by the
Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, §6, cl. 1, and are
therefore immune from judicial interference. ' 37 The first problem the
Court addressed in USSF was whether the subcommittee's action was
"within the sphere of legislative activity." In solving this problem the
Court adopted the basic test in Kilbourn by looking "to see whether the
activities took place 'in a session of the House by one of its members in
relation to the business before it.' "38 After applying this test, the Court
concluded that the power of investigation, as conducted by the Senate
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 505, 89 S.Ct. at i955, 23 L.Ed.2d at 507.
408 U.S. 606, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972).
Id. at 618, 92 S.Ct. at 2623, 33 L.Ed.2d at 598.
412 U.S. 306, 93 S.Ct. 2018, 36 L.Ed.2d 912 (1973).
Id. at 315, 93 S.Ct. at 2026, 36 L.Ed.2d at 922.
Reinstein, supra note 14, at 1171-77.
421 U.S. at 501, 95 S.Ct. at 1820, 44 L.Ed.2d at 335.
Id. at 503, 95 S.Ct. at 1821, 44 L.Ed.2d at 336.
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Subcommittee on Internal Security, met this requirement,39 and therefore,
the issuance of a subpoena was a legitimate tool of congressional investigations. In addition the Court stated that once immunity attaches to the
actions of Congressmen in the issuance of the subpoena, it likewise at40
taches to the chief counsel as well.
The second issue addressed by the Court was USSF's claim that the
subponea invaded its privacy and therefore could not be immune from
judicial questioning. In answering this contention the Court held that the
respondents improperly relied on language in Gravel in making their
claim,4 1 since Gravel was referring to actions "not essential to legislating."
The Court held the claim was inapplicable to the situation in USSF where
the subcommittee's action was considered "essential.14 USSF's next contention as to improper motives behind the subcommittee's investigation
was similiarly rejected, as the Court reaffirmed the position enunciated in
Tenney by stating "in determining the legitimacy of a congressional act
we do not look to the motives alleged to have prompted it."' 4
Finally, the Court considered USSF's contention that the subpoena's
purpose was to harass, chill, punish and deter USSF in the exercise of its
first amendment rights and therefore the judiciary should intervene to
protect those rights. By relying on the absolute nature of legislative immunity and a necessarily broad construction of the privilege, so as to
maintain the independence of the legislature, the Supreme Court denied
this claim and stated: "[t]he Clause was written to prevent the need to
be confronted by such 'questioning' and to forbid invocation of judicial
power to challenge the wisdom of Congress' use of its investigative authority.""4 Therefore, in refusing to allow a first amendment exception to the
privilege, the majority declined to hold that the legislative privilege must
yield when individual constitutional rights are involved.
39. The committee was charged with the duty to inquire into possible foreign infiltration
and the need to know the funding of USSF was established in the following excerpt from the
suit:
USSF asserted it does not know the source of it funds; in light of the Senate
authorization to the subcommittee to investigate "infiltration by persons who are
or may be under the domination of ... foreign governments" ...

it is clear that

the subponea to discover USSF's bank records "may fairly be deemed within [the
Subcommittee's] province."
Id. at 507, 95 S.Ct. at 1823, 44 L.Ed.2d at 338-39.
40. Id. at 506-07, 95 S.Ct. at 1823, 44 L.Ed.2d at 339.
41. In support of their claim respondents quoted the following language from Gravel:
[N]o prior case has held that Members of Congress would be immune if they
executed an invalid resolution by themselves carrying out an illegal arrest, or if, in
order to secure information for a hearing, themselves seized property or invaded the
privacy of a citizen. Neither they nor their aides should be immune from liability
or questioning in such circumstances.
408 U.S. at 621, 92 S.Ct. at 2625, 33 L.Ed.2d at 600 (1972).
42. 421 U.S. at 508, 95 S.Ct. at 1824, 44 L.Ed.2d at 339.
43. Id. at 508, 95 S.Ct. at 1824, 44 L.Ed.2d at 339.
44. Id. at 511, 95 S.Ct. at 1825, 44 L.Ed.2d at 341.
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Joined by Justices Stewart and Brennan, Justice Marshall wrote a concurring opinion,45 in which he supported the majority position on the granting of immunity. He was clear, however, in stating that he believed congressional actions should be judicially reviewable where there is a subponea issued to a third party, and the case is otherwise appropriate for the
introduction of constitutional objections." In dissent, Justice Douglas restated his opinion in Tenney, that legislative immunity should never be
applied to deprive people of their constitutional rights under the first
amendment. 7
The majority's reasoning in USSF is well grounded in prior Supreme
Court decisions authorizing a broad and somewhat absolute interpretation
of the speech or debate clause's protection as applied to members of Congress. The need for maintaining an independent legislative branch is clear
and in order to achieve this only a minimum amount of judicial interference is reasonable. The Court correctly applied the limitations of the prior
cases and the rationale behind the privilege of legislative immunity in
denying an injunction against the senators. The clause says that Congress
shall not be questioned in any other place for any speech or debate in either
House. By upholding the absoluteness of the privilege, the Supreme Court
in USSF rejected the idea that one can override the privilege by asserting
violations of first amendment rights. Consequently, there is no balancing
of legislative immunity with other constitutional rights when an infringement is alleged. Once it is determined that the activity in question is
within the legislative sphere and essential to the business of legislating,
legislative immunity will prevail. Judicial interference and intimidation
pose the same threat to an independent legislative branch, be it from
private civil actions or from executive initiated actions. If the privilege is
to be effective it must be absolute in its application.
JOHN J. COPELAN, JR.
45.
46.
47.

Five Justices formed the majority, three concurred and one dissented.
421 U.S. at 513-17, 95 S.Ct. at 1827-28, 44 L.Ed.2d at 343-44.
Id. at 518, 95 S.Ct. at 1829, 44 L.Ed.2d at 345.

